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PROVIDING ENVIRONMENTAL
 WHISTLEBLOWERS WITH 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROTECTIONS
RICHARD E. CONDIT1
ABSTRACT
This article examines the strengths and weaknesses of the 
employee protection provisions contained in the major federal 
environmental statutes and makes recommendations for 
needed improvements. With these improvements, the United 
States can realize the benefi ts that well-protected employees 
can contribute to public health and environmental protection.
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INTRODUCTION
From the early 1970s and into the 1980s, Congress enacted six major 
federal environmental laws.2 They include such landmark legislation as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Superfund law.3 These laws are the 
basis for the environmental protections that exist today, and are responsible 
for signifi cant overall improvements in the quality of our nation’s water, 
air, and land.4 As a result of the passage and implementation of these laws 
and their corresponding regulatory structures, public health benefi ts have 
followed.5 Signifi cant research developments regarding the environment and 
the connections between environmental contaminants and individual’s health, 
particularly children’s health, were stimulated by our nation’s commitment to 
clean water, clean air, and the control and cleanup of hazardous waste.6 
The comprehensive nature of these laws, necessitated by the extent of our 
nation’s environmental problems, made it clear from the start that government 
regulators would need to not only support, but also frequently push those 
companies and individuals who control the sources of pollution in order to 
meet statutory objectives. When a push was needed, often times affected 
2. See Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1986) (enacted 
as Act of 1976); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1973), (enacted as Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, amended in 1972 and 1977); Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (1996) (enacted in 1974); Resource Conservation 
& Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1984) (enacted in 1976); Clean Air Act 
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1973) (enacted as Act of 1970, signifi cantly amended in 1977); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2002) (originally enacted as Act of 1980).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601; U.S.C. § 1251; 42 U.S.C. § 300(f); 42 U.S.C. § 6901; 33 
U.S.C. § 7401; 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
4. See 40 Years of Achievements, 1970-2010, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/40th/achieve.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2011) (describing how the EPA was 
established to help reduce existing and prevent future environmental damage); ASPEN 
INST., EPA 40TH ANNIVERSARY: 10 WAYS EPA HAS STRENGTHENED AMERICA, http://
www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/fi les/content/docs/events/EPA _40_Brochure.pdf) 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2010) (recounting how young people today are able to swim in 
natural waterways without risking their health, when twenty years ago doing so would 
have posed a major health hazard). See also, William D. Ruckelshaus & Christine 
Todd Whitman, A Siege Against the EPA and Environmental Progress, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-siege-against-the-epa-and-
environmental-progress/2011/03/23/ABsuyeRB_story.html (last visited November 1, 
2011) (explaining the importance of preventing severe budget cuts to the EPA).
5. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 4 (noting that by regulating air pollution, the EPA 
has turned lakes and rivers from public health concerns to resources for drinking water and 
public recreation).
6. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, 
RESEARCH PLANS, available at http://www.epa.gov/ord/htm/multi-yearplans.htm (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2011) (laying out the EPA’s multi-year research plans in the areas of clean 
air, drinking water, ecosystem services, endocrine disruptors, global change, human 
health, human health risk assessment, land research, safe pesticides/safe products, and 
water quality).  
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residents and environmentally aware organizations were expected to provide 
it. These environmental laws empowered impacted residents and organizations 
to bring lawsuits to enforce statutory and regulatory standards and to force the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to follow through on its duties 
mandated by the laws.7 The support needed to bring these lawsuits would, in 
part, come from employees of companies and organizations who might witness 
environmental threats or violations. To protect employees who might assist in 
the enforcement of the environmental laws, Congress included provisions in 
all six of the major environmental statutes that enabled employees to fi ght 
back if they were subjected to retaliation for revealing potential environmental 
violations.8 In theory, the provisions provide suffi cient protections for members 
of the workforce who help enforce environmental standards and encourage 
employees’ participation in efforts to ensure protection of our environment. 
Employee protection from retaliation is not just intended to cover employees 
working in environmental cleanup, but also workers such as auto mechanics 
who store and dispose of solvents; factory workers in facilities that vent 
contaminants into the air; and employees whose employers have permits to 
store, dispose of, or release chemicals into the environment.9  
 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND FOOD AND WATER CONTAMINATION
For most people, environmental protection pursued through structures 
established by the major federal environmental statutes and their implementing 
regulations presents a dizzying array of seemingly esoteric rules and 
requirements. For each of the federal environmental laws on the books, there are 
often hundreds of regulations promulgated over a number of years in an effort 
to addressed a multitude of situations.10 Additionally, each state that is given 
authority to implement the laws may generate another set of complementary 
statutes with corresponding regulations.11 Looking at the many pages of federal 
or state regulations governing the protection of our environment, and listening 
to the army of paid lobbyists and lawyers who argue over the regulations—it 
is easy to lose sight of what Congress was trying to achieve.
7. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006) (allowing private citizens to sue the 
U.S. government, or any instrument or agency of the government, that is allegedly in 
violation of RCRA or that is handling hazardous materials in a way that might pose an 
imminent and substantial danger to health or the environment).
8. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2006) (providing for the protection of a 
whistleblowing employee); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006) (elaborating on the prohibition 
against discriminating against any whistleblowing employee).
9. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (protecting a broad array of employees who 
alert the EPA to violations of the Clean Water Act).
10. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60–98 (2011) (air), § 104–149 (water), § 240–282 (solid & 
hazardous wastes), § 300–374 (Superfund), § 700–799 (TSCA).  
11. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 190–941 (2011) (regulating 
projects for water quality improvement, air quality improvement, wetlands restoration, 
and solid waste recovery and management). 
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Despite the complexity of environmental regulation, a substantial part of 
what Congress has tried to achieve by creating and funding major environmental 
laws through the EPA is to protect and improve the quality of our air and water. 
Clean air is needed to ensure that each breath we take is not contaminated 
with unhealthy particulates or toxic chemicals, while clean water is needed for 
drinking, to support food sources, and for recreation.12  
It is easy for most of us to see the connection between our health and the ill 
effects of drinking contaminated water or inhaling dirty air.13 But what might be 
less apparent is the connection between pesticides and herbicides and the health 
consequences that result from human exposure to, and incidental ingestion of, 
such pollutants. Even less obvious is the role that toxic air pollutants play in 
contaminating soil, crops, and domestic animals. For example, the most notable 
toxic air pollutant is mercury, which may be released from an incinerator or 
coal-fi red power plant in one state, but may end up contaminating the waters 
12. As the EPA has noted in its overview of the importance of water quality criteria: 
Many types of microscopic plants and animals, such as plankton, water beetles, and 
insects that live in or on the water, serve as food for small fi sh. Small fi sh are eaten 
by larger fi sh which, in turn, are consumed by even larger fi sh. These large fi sh may 
ultimately be consumed by humans. All life along the food chain is dependent on 
the water environment and it is for this reason that the quality of the nation’s surface 
waters must be protected.
Basic Information: Water Quality Criteria, U.S. ENVL PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.
gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/criteria/basic.cfmupdated (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
13. For example, an expert on the deleterious impact of pollution on children’s 
health has opined: “Environmental and occupational exposures have been recognized to 
be potent causes of human cancer for more than two hundred years. Asbestos, benzene, 
the benzidine-based dyes, beryllium, 1,3–butadiene, chromium, ethylene oxide, ionizing 
radiation, nickel, nitrosamines, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH’s), plutonium, 
radium, 2,3,7,8–tetrachlorodibenzo-dioxin and wood dust are among the environmental 
and occupational carcinogens that have been identifi ed through astute clinical observation 
and confi rmed through toxicological and epidemiological research.” Philip J. Landrigan, 
Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Testimony Before the President’s Cancer 
Panel: Childhood Cancer and the Environment, East Brunswick, N.J., Sept. 16, 2008, at 
1, 16, available at http://www.mountsinai.org/static_fi les/MSMC/Files/Patient%20Care/
Children/Childrens%20Environmental%20Health%20Center/President%20Cancer%20
Panel_9.16.08.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
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and fi sh in another state.14 Nevertheless, the impact of air emissions of certain 
toxic chemicals on the food chain was not meaningfully recognized by EPA 
until the latter part of the 1980s.15 This is alarming considering the dangerous 
levels of contamination throughout our food chain that could potentially result 
from the cumulative collection of toxins and particulates emitted into the air.
The scientifi c evidence of the contamination of our food chain by toxic 
chemicals has developed signifi cantly during the years following passage of 
the original Clean Air Act and other environmental laws. For example, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) tests approximately 280 typical 
food products in the U.S. food supply to determine the amount of pesticides, 
chemical contaminants, and nutrients present.16 From these results, the FDA 
estimates the extent of the exposure to harmful chemicals that the average 
American receives from the foods in her diet.17 Data collected between 2006 
and 2008 shows that there are a variety of every day foods that are contaminated
14. EPA describes the progression of mercury through the food-chain as follows: 
 When mercury falls in rain or snow, it may fl ow into bodies of water like lakes 
and streams. When it falls out of the air as dry deposition, it may eventually be 
washed into those bodies by rain. Bacteria in soils and sediments convert mercury 
to methylmercury. In this form, it is taken up by tiny aquatic plants and animals. 
Fish that eat these organisms build up methylmercury in their bodies. As ever-
bigger fi sh eat smaller ones, the methylmercury is concentrated further up the 
food chain. This process is called “bioaccumulation.”. 
Methylmercury concentrations in fi sh depend on many factors, including 
mercury, the concentration in water, water pH and temperature, the amount of 
dissolved solids and organic matter in the water, and what organisms live in 
the water. Methylmercury concentrations in fi sh may also be affected by the 
presence of sulfur and other chemicals in the water. Because of these variables, 
and because food webs are very complex, bioaccumulation is hard to predict 
and can vary from one water body to another.
However, in a given water body, the highest concentrations of methylmercury 
are generally found in large fi sh that eat other fi sh. The concentrations of 
methylmercury in large fi sh can be over a million-fold larger than in the 
surrounding water. 
Human Exposure, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY,http://www.epa.gov/mercury/
exposure.htm#3 (last visited Dec. 11, 2011).
15. See Matthew Lorber et al., Evaluating Terrestrial Food Chain Impacts 
Near Sources of Dioxin Release in U.S. EPA Risk Assessments. 48 ORGANOHALOGEN 
COMPOUNDS 264, 264 (2000) (asserting that in the late 1980s, research established that 
humans are primarily exposed to dioxin-like compounds through consuming animal food 
products). 
16. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Total Diet Study–Study Design, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodContaminantsAdulteration/TotalDietStudy/
ucm184232.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
17. Id.  
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with mercury, volatile organic compounds (VOCs),18 and various pesticides or 
pesticide residues.19  
Similarly, in the EPA’s ongoing study of human health and ecological 
risks of exposure to dioxin-like compounds,20 the Agency makes clear that 
the primary means of human exposure is through the food chain. Dioxin-like 
compounds enter the human food chain via “air-to-plant-to-animal and water/
sediment-to-fi sh.”21 The EPA describes the process as follows:   
Vegetation receives these compounds via atmospheric 
deposition in the vapor and particle phases. The compounds 
are retained on plant surfaces and bioaccumulated in the fatty 
tissues of animals that feed on these plants . . . . In the aquatic 
food chain, dioxins enter water systems via direct discharge 
or deposition and runoff from watersheds. Fish accumulate 
these compounds through their direct contact with water, 
suspended particles, and bottom sediments and through their 
consumption of aquatic organisms.22
Once released, dioxin-like compounds and other toxic chemicals can remain 
in the environment for years and bioaccumulate. Thus, these chemicals pose a 
signifi cant threat to human health and the environment.   
The risks of exposure to toxic chemicals through food, water, air, or skin 
contact is particularly dangerous for children. According to Professor Philip 
Landrigan of Mount Sinai School of Medicine: 
18. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Total Diet Study–Pesticides, http://www.
fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodContaminantsAdulteration/TotalDietStudy/ucm184658.
htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (explaining that volatile organic compounds tested 
include such chemicals as benzene, toluene, tetrachloroethylene (TCE), styrene, and 
chloroform).
19. Id.
20. “The term ‘dioxin’ is commonly used to refer to a family of toxic chemicals 
that share a similar chemical structure and induce harm through a similar mechanism. 
Dioxins have been characterized by EPA as likely human carcinogens and are anticipated 
to increase the risk of cancer at background levels of exposure . . . . Examples of dioxins 
include polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polychlorinated dibenzo dioxins (PCDDs), 
and polychlorinated dibenzo furans (PCDFs).” Dioxin, ENVTL.. PROT. AGENCY, http://
cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/CFM/nceaQFind.cfm?keyword=Dioxin (last visited Dec. 12, 2011)
21. Exposure and Human Health Reassessment of 2,3,7,8–Tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-Dioxin (TCDD) and Related Compounds National Academy Sciences (NAS) Review 
Draft, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 4–11 (2003), http://www.
epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/dioxin/nas-review/pdfs/part3/dioxin_pt3_ch04_oct2004.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2011).
22. Id. at 4–12.
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Children are exposed to toxic and carcinogenic chemicals 
through many routes—air they breathe, water they drink, 
foods they eat, medications they consume, and environments 
they inhabit, including their homes, day care centers, schools, 
and motor vehicles. Children have unique routes of exposure 
with no parallel among adults, for example, exposure in utero 
through transplacental transfer, and exposure postnatally via 
breast milk.23
An analysis undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 
1993, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN,24 established 
that children are uniquely vulnerable to toxic exposures in the environment 
because human development is complex, delicate, and therefore all too easily 
disrupted by environmental exposures.25 The NAS found this vulnerability 
to have four sources.26 Children have disproportionately heavy exposures to 
many chemicals.27 Children’s metabolic pathways, especially in fetal life and 
in the fi rst months after birth, are immature.28 Infants and children are therefore 
slow to detoxify and excrete many environmental chemicals and thus more 
vulnerable to them. 
These special vulnerabilities make the exposure of children to toxic 
chemicals through the food chain or other routes particularly troubling. For 
example, data from the National Cancer Institute (NCI) indicates that the 
incidence of certain cancers in children has signifi cantly increased. Professor 
Landigran explains that increases in incidence have occurred for three 
major malignancies of children and young adults, according to Surveillance 
Epidemiology and End Result data from the National Cancer Institute: 
1. Leukemia. Leukemia is the most common childhood 
cancer. Incidence of leukemia in [zero] to [fourteen] 
year-old U.S. children increased from 3.3 per 100,000 
in 1975 to 5.1 per 100,000 in 2005, [a] 55% increase. 
Acute lymphocytic leukemia increased in the same 
years from 2.2 to 4.0 per 100,000, [a] 81% increase. 
23. See Landrigan, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that attempts to mitigate exposure to 
sources of carcinogens must consider the risks that children face exclusively).
24. NAT’L RES. COUNSEL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 
(Nat’l Academy of Sciences 1993), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?
isbn=0309048753 (last visited Dec 15, 2011).
25. See Landrigan, supra note 13, at 2.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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2. Primary Brain Cancer. This is the second leading 
cancer of children. Incidence of cancer of the brain and 
nervous system in [zero] to [fourteen] year-old children 
increased from 2.3 per 1000,000 in 1975 to 3.2 per 
100,000 in 2005, [a] 39% increase. 
3. Testicular Cancer. Incidence of testicular cancer in 
white men (most of them adolescents and young adult 
males) increased from 4.3 per 100,000 to 7.0 per 
100,000 in 2005, a 51% increase. Among black men 
in the same years, both the absolute incidence and the 
rate of increase were much lower—from 0.9 to 1.3 per 
100,000. 
The cause of these reported increases in incidence is not 
known. . . . An unresolved question is whether these increases 
in incidence of childhood cancer could be due, at least in part, 
to exposures to carcinogens in the environment.29
The prevalence of such potentially deadly diseases provides support for 
increased vigilance in protecting the food chain, air, and water from toxins.  
Considering what is at stake, the importance of enforcement of 
environmental standards cannot be overstated. Aggressive regulation, driven 
by the latest science and focused on preventing exposure to and the ingestion 
of toxic chemicals, is essential to improving air and water quality and reducing 
contamination of the food chain. Additionally, vigilant citizens and employees 
from the industries and businesses that may release dangerous chemicals are 
needed to ensure that the regulatory standards that protect our food chain 
and water supply are enforced. Unfortunately, employees in industries and 
businesses that release toxic chemicals into the environment or who are 
responsible for the cleanup of contamination are poorly protected by the rights 
and procedures presently provided in the federal environmental laws. The 
well-intentioned, but outdated employee protection provisions contained in 
federal environmental statutes must be changed if more employees are going 
to be encouraged to come forward and help budget-strapped federal and state 
agencies adequately protect public health and the environment.   
29. See id. (emphasis in original.) 
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ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES WITH EMPLOYEE PROTECTION PROVISIONS
Each of the six major federal environmental statutes contains an employee 
protection provision.30 For the most part, each provision shares a common 
purpose—to protect whistleblowing employees from retaliation should they 
seek to have the law properly enforced. For example, the Clean Water Act 
employee protection provision states:
No person shall fi re, or in any other way discriminate against, 
or cause to be fi red or discriminated against, any employee or 
any authorized representative of employees by reason of the 
fact that such employee or representative has fi led, instituted, 
or caused to be fi led or instituted any proceeding under this 
chapter, or has testifi ed or is about to testify in any proceeding 
resulting from the administration or enforcement of the 
provisions of this chapter.31
In this way, Congress sought to protect employees who provide 
information concerning a possible violation of environmental standards 
from discrimination by their employers. Likewise, any worker who 
provides information relating to an alleged violation of a pollution 
control law committed by his employer or who initiates a proceeding to 
enforce a pollution control law against an employer is thus protected from 
discrimination.    
 To this end, Section 1367 of the Clean Water Act not only prohibits fi ring 
or discrimination, but also provides an administrative procedure under which 
the employee or his representative can seek redress for any violation of this 
prohibition. Under this procedure, the Secretary of Labor is charged with 
investigating discrimination charges brought under the CWA, and will issue 
fi ndings and a decision.32 If the Secretary fi nds a violation, she then issues 
orders to abate it, which could include, where appropriate, the rehiring of the 
employee to his former position with back pay. Also, the person committing 
the violation must pay the costs incurred by the employee to obtain redress, 
which may include attorneys’ fees.33 Ultimately, the Secretary’s decision is 
subject to judicial review.34 Crucially, because the protections provided were
30. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2006); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); SDWA, 42 
U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2006); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2006); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006); 
and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2006). These six laws have become the beach head 
for forty-seven whistleblower statutes. For a comprehensive guide to their provisions and 
how to use them, see generally TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASARANI, THE CORPORATE 
WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR COMMITTING THE TRUTH 
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2010) (providing advice for individuals considering blowing 
the whistle, including where to fi nd necessary information and what legal options exist for 
whistleblowers).  
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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 designed to prohibit discrimination in employment, Congress directed that 
complaints of retaliation and discrimination be investigated and adjudicated 
by the Department of Labor.35  
Complaint and Adjudication Process
 The process by which an environmental whistleblower who has been the 
victim of retaliation begins with the whistleblower fi ling a complaint with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Area Offi ce for the 
location where the alleged retaliation or discrimination took place.36 OSHA has 
ten area or regional offi ces located throughout the United States.37 Although 
the regulations allow a complaint to be fi led either orally or in writing,38 the 
OSHA WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL states that complaints 
should be fi led in writing.39 Likewise, the best practice is to fi le the complaint 
in writing and in a manner such that the sender can prove the complaint was 
sent and received. Moreover, the regulations permit the complaint to be fi led 
via facsimile.40
In terms of timing, complaints must be fi led within thirty days of learning 
that alleged discrimination occurred.41 Under exceptional circumstances, this
 very short statute of limitations may be extended,42 but such extensions are 
rarely granted.43  
35. Id. Within the Department of Labor, whistleblower cases are processed in 
three stages. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration conducts the initial 
investigation of environmental whistleblower complaints. The Offi ce of Administrative 
Law Judges adjudicates the complaints that are taken to hearing. The Administrative 
Review Board reviews cases that are appealed and makes a fi nal decision for the agency. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 24 (2011)..
36. 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(c) (2011). In general, the Department of Labor’s regulations 
spell out the process. See id.
37. See The Whistleblower Protection Program, U. S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://63.234.227.130/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) 
(instructing that the complaint should be fi led with the OSHA offi ce located in the 
geographic region where the employee lives or worked). 
38. 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(b) (2011). 
39. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA INSTRUCTION: 
WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, 11–3 (Aug. 22, 2003), http://www.osha.
gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/DIS_0-0_9.pdf (last visited on November 14, 2011). As the 
Manual is somewhat outdated, and because the regulations were revised in 2011, the 
regulations will control. 
40. 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d) (2011) (2011).  
41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300j–9(i)(2)(A) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 
2622(b)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9610(b) (2006).  
42. 29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d) (2011).
43. See, e.g., Prybys v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, ARB No. 96–064 at 8, ALJ No. 
95–CAA–15 (Dep’t of Labor Nov. 27, 1996) (deferring to Congress‘s determination that 
a thirty day statutory limitations period, although “extremely brief“ in the eyes of a court, 
“must be scrupulously observed”). Note that Department of Labor whistleblower case 
decisions can be readily located on the Department’s Offi ce of Administrative Law Judge’s 
(OALJ) web site: http://www.oalj.dol.gov/.
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When the complaint is fi led, OSHA is required to provide a copy to the 
employer.44 The copy provided to the employer may be redacted in accordance 
with the Privacy Act45 or other confi dentiality laws.46 In the vast majority of 
cases, however, there is little, if any, information that will be redacted from the 
copy of the complaint provided to the employer.   
In terms of OSHA’s investigation of the complaint, three of the employee 
protection provisions mandate that investigations of whistleblower complaints 
be completed within thirty days, while the others leave open the timing for 
completion of the investigation. 47 Nevertheless, in practice, investigations are 
rarely, if ever, completed within thirty or even sixty days. Most investigations 
of factually complex cases can take ninety days or more, and many OSHA 
whistleblower investigations have taken more than six months or even years 
to complete.
To be successful, the employee must show in the complaint, and through any 
interview she may provide to OSHA, that the employer “knew or suspected 
that the employee engaged in protected activity and that the protected activity 
was a motivating factor in the adverse action.”48 However, even if the employee 
establishes a prima facie case, under environmental statutes passed in the 
1980s, the complaint will be dismissed if the employer can demonstrate by a 
“preponderance of the evidence . . . that the [employer] would have taken the 
same adverse action in the absence of the [employee’s] protected activity.”49 
Yet, more recent corporate whistleblower laws, including amendments to 
the Energy Reorganization Act for nuclear power and nuclear weapons
whistleblowers, have increased the employer’s burden for establishing 
an “independent justifi cation” for taking a personnel action to “clear and 
convincing evidence.”50
44. 29 C.F.R. § 24.104(a) (2011).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (2006).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 24.104(a) (2011).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(A) (2006), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B)(i) (2006), 42 
U.S.C. § 7622(b)(2)(A) (2006), (“[T]hirty days of the receipt of such complaint, the 
Secretary shall complete such investigation and shall notify in writing the complainant (and 
any person acting in his behalf) and the person alleged to have committed such violation 
of the results of the investigation conducted pursuant to this subparagraph”). However, 
RCRA, CERCLA and CWA do not provide a deadline for the investigative phase. See 
33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2006), 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) (2011), 42 U.S.C. § 9610(b) (2006) 
(mandating that “the Secretary of Labor shall cause such investigation to be made as he 
deems appropriate”). Despite the distinctions in the language of the employee protection 
provisions regarding the timing of the investigation, the Labor Department’s regulations 
specify that the Assistant Secretary will issue a written determination “within 30 days of 
fi ling of the complaint.” 29 C.F.R. § 24.105(a) (2011).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 24.104(e)(3) (2011).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 24.104(e)(4) (2011).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(B) (2006).
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When the investigation has been completed and the evidence has been 
evaluated, OSHA issues an order either fi nding a violation and awarding relief 
or notifying the parties that it found no wrongdoing.51 The relief that may be 
awarded to a successful complainant includes reinstatement, back pay, back 
benefi ts, changes to terms and conditions of employment, and compensatory 
damages.52 Attorneys’ fees and the costs of litigation are also available.53 
Exemplary damages54 may be awarded, but only in cases brought under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act and Toxic Substances Control Act.55   
If the employee or employer wishes to contest OSHA’s investigatory 
determination, she must do so within thirty days of receipt of the decision.56 
Additionally, the request for a hearing must be in writing and state whether the 
objection is to the fi ndings or the decision.57 If a timely objection is fi led, then 
the order is stayed and an evidentiary hearing is scheduled. But if the objection 
is not timely, then the order becomes the fi nal decision of the Department of 
Labor and is no longer subject to judicial review.58 
If properly requested, a hearing is conducted as a bench trial before a 
Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).59 The pre-trial 
process includes discovery and motions practice.60 However, because there 
is a question of whether the Department of Labor has been granted statutorily
51. 29 C.F.R. § 24.105(a) (2011).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 24.105(a)(1) (2011).
53. Id.
54. Exemplary damages are awarded to punish and deter reckless or wanton conduct. 
 Johnson v. Old Dominion Sec., 86–CAA–3, 86–ERA–4, 86–ERA–5, at 11 (Dep’t of Labor 
May 29, 1991). For example, in a particularly extreme case, the Administrative Law Judge 
explained:
[I]t is hard to conceive of something as heinous as an agency of the Federal 
Government surreptitiously paying an opposing party’s [i.e., an employee’s‘] 
attorney so much money that the attorney in effect becomes its agent rather than 
the opposing party’s, apparently in an effect to prevent violations of environmental 
protection statutes from being discovered and/or to mitigate the punishment for 
those violations. This is conduct that shocks the conscience, and which must be 
deterred in no uncertain terms. 
Beliveau v. Naval Undersea Warfare Ctr., ALJ Nos. 97–SDW–1, 97–SDW–4, at 44 
(Dep’t of Labor June 29, 2000). The ALJ awarded $281,115.50 in exemplary damages. 
Id. at 44–45.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 24.105(a)(1) (2011).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 24.106(a) (2011).
57. Id.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 24.106(b) (2011).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 24.107 (2011).  
60. See id. 
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based subpoena power for these proceedings, persons or entities who are not 
parties to the case may not be compelled to testify or produce documents.61  
Once the hearing is completed and the record is closed, the ALJ will issue a 
recommended decision granting relief or dismissing the case.62 The case may 
be decided on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary decision.63 When 
the ALJ’s recommended decision is issued, any party that wants to seek review 
of the decision must fi le a petition for review with the Administrative Review 
Board (ARB) within ten business days of the date of the ALJ’s decision.64  
A timely request for ARB review renders the ALJ’s recommended decision 
inoperative.65 If the petition for review is not timely or the ARB denies review 
of the decision, then the ALJ’s decision becomes the agency’s fi nal decision. If 
the ARB accepts the petition for review, it “will review the factual fi ndings of 
the ALJ under the substantial evidence standard, according to the regulation.”66 
However, in practice, both the ALJ’s factual fi ndings and conclusions of law 
are reviewed de novo.67 If the employer is deemed to have violated the law, then 
the ARB will award relief, but will deny the complaint if it fi nds no violation.68 
In terms of the timing of ARB review, regulations and several of the 
laws specify that the Secretary of Labor has ninety days from the fi ling 
of the complaint in which to issue a fi nal decision.69 In practice, however, 
61. The Administrative Review Board has issued confl icting rulings over whether 
the Labor Department has subpoena power under the six environmental laws and related 
statutes. See Childers v. Carolina Power and Light Co., ARB No. 98–077, ALJ No. 1997–
ERA–32, at 12–13 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 29, 2000) (asserting that the agency’s authority 
to hold an adjudicatory hearing gives it an implied power to issue subpoenas to compel 
witness attendance despite other cases holding to the contrary). For a case holding that 
the Labor Department was not granted subpoena power by the employee protection 
provisions of the six environmental laws, see Bobreski v. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75–78 
(D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that the plain meaning of the environmental statutes reveal that 
Congress had no intention of giving subpoena authority to the Secretary of Labor). In an 
earlier, unpublished decision involving a whistleblower case brought under the CWA, the 
court held that the employee protection provision did not grant subpoena power, reasoning 
in part that “Congress did not intend to authorize the issuance of subpoenas for purposes of 
carrying out other sections of the Act, including the whistleblower position.” Immanuel v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 139 F.3d 889 *6 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). Thus, the authority to 
compel testimony or information via subpoena under these laws is open to debate.
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 24.109 (2011) (explaining that the ALJ’s decision is comprised of 
fi ndings, conclusions, and an order regarding remedies). 
63. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 18.40 (2011) (stipulating that any party can make a motion 
for a summary decision on a part or all of the proceeding at least twenty days before the 
hearing date).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(a) (2011).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b) (2011). 
66. Id. 
67.   See Williams v. Baltimore City Pub. School Sys., ARB No. 01-021, ALJ No. 
00-CAA-15, slip op. at 1 n.3 (Dep’t of Labor May 30, 2003) (explaining that the board 
determines all facts and conclusions de novo); see also 5 U.S.C. § 557 (b) (2006) (“On 
appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would 
have in making the initial decision . . . .”).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(d)-(e) (2011).
69. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(A) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(c) (2011); 42 
U.S.C. § 300j-9(2)(b)(i) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
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such decisions usually take more than ninety days to hand down, from the 
complaint’s fi ling. Thus, the chance that a case may go through all three stages 
of the Department of Labor process within ninety days is unlikely; in reality, 
delays of one to two years or more are common. 
Judicial review of a fi nal decision of the ARB is initiated by fi ling a petition 
for review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit where the alleged 
violation occurred or where the employee resided on the date(s) of the 
violation.70 In most instances, the time limit for fi ling a petition for review is 
sixty days. However, several of the environmental laws specify time limits that 
range from ninety to 120 days.71 
The record before the ALJ and ARB form the basis for the Court of Appeals’ 
review. The court will review the case under standards established by the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act72 and case law. The Court of Appeals reviews the 
record to determine whether the ARB acted arbitrarily, capriciously, abused its 
discretion, or otherwise acted outside the law.73  
After examining the investigatory and adjudicatory processes of 
whistleblower protections under the major environmental laws, it is important 
to consider the critical, substantive areas of the employee protection provisions 
and the case law that has interpreted them.  
PROTECTED ACTIVITIES
Am I protected? That is the question that most employees contemplate 
before blowing the whistle. It is also the question that many employees 
contemplate after their employer retaliates against them for blowing the 
whistle. The employee protection provisions in the environmental laws have 
been interpreted to cover two major classes of protected activities. The fi rst 
class involves commencing a proceeding, testifying, assisting, or taking other 
action in a formal legal proceeding to further the purpose of the environmental 
law(s) at issue.74 The second class of protection involves more informal 
communications, such as warning the employer about a suspected violation of
an environmental law, or regulation or permit issued thereunder; refusing to
70. 29 C.F.R. § 24.112(a) (2011).
71. See 29 C.F.R. § 24.112(a)–(d) (2011) (creating exceptions to the stated 60-
day limit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, which specify 
different time limits for fi ling a petition).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (outlining the scope of judicial review for the Court of 
Appeals).
73. The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the Administrative 
Procedure Act empowers federal courts to “overturn an administrative agency’s decision 
only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law,’ or ‘unsupported by substantial evidence’” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-
(E) (2006) (evidence “pursuant to Knox v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 723–24 (4th 
Cir. 2006). Likewise, courts review the ARB’s interpretation of the governing statute using 
the deferential standard set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (reviewing the ARB‘s interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act).”  
74.    29 C.F.R. § 24.102(b) (2011).
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engage in an activity made unlawful by an environmental law(s); or testifying 
or preparing to testify in a Congressional, federal, or state proceeding regarding 
any provision or proposed provision of the subject environmental law(s).75 How 
do these standards apply in the real world? The types of protected acts vary 
almost as widely as the employers covered by environmental laws. However, 
over the years, case precedent has established a fairly specifi c set of standards 
used to determine which employee concerns are protected. Some examples of 
protected actions include:
• Threatening to fi le an environmental citizen’s suit.76
• Contacting EPA offi cials to confi rm reporting requirements under 
CERCLA.77
• Reporting a carpet cleaning company’s regulatory violation and 
destruction of evidence.78
• Complaining of a gas odor on the job.79
• Expressing a general workplace safety concern that would have an 
environmental impact.80
• Perceiving wrongful conduct in the development and submission of 
data and reports to the government.81
• Expressing the concern that asbestos from indoor renovations may 
be escaping into the ambient air.82  
• Complaining about co-worker lighting a cigarette in an area 
where hydrogen gas from waste storage tanks is vented.83
75.    29 C.F.R. § 24.102(c) (2011).
76.   Crosby v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 85–TSC–2 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 17, 1993) (fi nal 
admin. review).
77.   Dodd v. Polysar Latex, 88–SWD–00004 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 22, 1994) (fi nal 
admin. review).
78.   McMahan v. Cal. Water Quality Control, 90–WPC–1 (Dep’t of Labor July 16, 
1993) (fi nal admin. review).
79.   Monteer v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 88-SWD-1 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 27, 1991) 
(fi nal admin. review).
80.   Hermanson v. Morrison and Knduson Corp., 94-CER-2 (Dep’t of Labor June 28, 
1996).
81.   Abu-Hjeli v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 89-WPC-1 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 24, 
1993) (fi nal admin. review).
82. Knox v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 725 (4th Cir. 2006).
83. Nathaniel v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 91-SWD-2 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 1, 
1995).
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• Raising concerns about whether contaminated soil should be land-
fi lled.84  
• Reporting paint overspray and paint fumes released into the ambient 
air.85
• Petitioning congressional subcommittees about alleged diminished 
RCRA regulation by the EPA, and complaining internally about 
inadequate and inappropriate regulation.86  
• Reporting a possible environmental hazard to a local fi re 
department.87  
Although an employee action may generally seem to fall under the umbrella 
of a particular environmental law, the employee has the burden of showing that 
she had a reasonable belief that the issue being raised may be a violation of one 
of the environmental laws, regulations, or permits. As the ARB has explained:
An employee who makes a complaint to the employer that 
is ‘grounded in conditions constituting reasonably perceived 
violations’ of the environmental acts, engages in protected 
activity. Similarly, expressing concerns to the employer that 
constitute reasonably perceived threats to environmental 
safety is protected activity under the environmental 
whistleblower protections.  
The employee need not prove that the hazards he or she 
perceived actually violated the environmental acts. Nor 
must an employee prove that his assessment of the hazard 
was correct. And we have also held that an employee need 
not prove that the condition he or she is concerned about 
has already resulted in a safety breakdown. On the other 
hand, a complaint that expresses only a vague notion that the 
employer’s conduct might negatively affect the environment 
is not protected. Nor is a complaint that is based on 
numerous assumptions and speculation.88
84. Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Svcs., Inc., 91-SWD-00001 (Dep’t of Labor Nov. 1, 1995).
85. Smith v. W. Sales & Testing, ARB No. 02-080, ALJ No. 01-CAA-17 (Dep’t of 
Labor Mar. 31, 2004).
86. Jenkins v. EPA, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 88-SWD-2 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 28, 
2003).
87. Masek v. Cadle Co., ARB No. 97-069, ALJ No. 95-WPC-1 (Dep’t of Labor Apr. 
28, 2000).
88. Erickson v. EPA, ARB Nos. 04-024, 04-025, ALJ Nos. 03-CAA-11, 19, 04-CAA-
1, slip op. at 7-8 (Dep’t of Labor Oct. 31, 2006). See also Dixon, ARB No. 06-147, 160, 
ALJ No. 2005-SDW-008, slip op. at 9 (Dep’t of Labor Aug. 28, 2008) (stating, “[o]n the 
other hand, a complaint that expresses only a vague notion that the employer’s conduct 
might negatively affect the environment or that is based on ‘numerous assumptions and 
speculation’ is not protected”) (citations omitted).
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For example, in a case where the issue of protected activity turned on the 
employee’s concerns about whether a certain substance was hazardous, the 
Secretary of Labor applied a reasonableness standard:  
The structure and purpose of the Act strongly support the 
adoption of a reasonableness test for determining whether 
an employee complaint about the treatment of a particular 
substance is protected under the whistleblower provision of 
the Act. As [ ] noted above, substances are hazardous wastes 
under the Act either because the EPA ‘lists’ them as such, or 
because they meet certain statutory and regulatory criteria. 
Most of the substances which are listed under RCRA are not 
identifi able by persons without a chemistry background. . . . It 
is unreasonable to expect the average lay person to know what 
is or is not on the Act’s hazardous waste ‘‘list.’’ Moreover, as 
. . . noted above, a substance need not be ‘listed’ by EPA in 
order to be deemed hazardous waste under the Act. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24. It may be hazardous waste within 
the meaning of the Act if it meets any of the four articulated 
tests for hazardousness. It is even less likely that the average 
lay person would be able to determine whether a particular 
substance met one of those tests for hazardousness. . . . [I]t is 
appropriate to apply a reasonableness standard in this type of 
situation.89
However, establishing that an employee engaged in one or more activities 
that are protected by the environmental laws does not end the analysis. Several 
other elements must be proven in order to establish a claim. For example, to 
establish a prima facie case under the employee protection provision of the 
CWA, an employee must show that:
(1) the plaintiff was an employee of the party charged with 
discrimination; (2) the plaintiff was engaged in a protected 
activity under the Clean Water Act; (3) the employer took 
an adverse action against the plaintiff; and (4) the evidence 
created a reasonable inference that the adverse action was
89. Minard v. Nerco Delmar Co., 92-SWD-1, slip op. at 4-5 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 25, 
1994).
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taken because of the plaintiff’s participation in the statutorily 
protected activity.90
In a later case, the ARB constructed the formulation a bit differently:
To prevail on a complaint of unlawful discrimination under 
the environmental whistleblower protection provisions, a 
complainant must establish that he or she engaged in protected 
activity of which the respondent was aware; he or she suffered 
adverse employment action; and the protected activity was 
the reason for the adverse action, i.e., that a nexus existed 
between the protected activity and the adverse action.91 
No matter the formulation, the requirements are essentially the same as the 
requirements set forth in the CWA.  
Whether an employee’s actions are protected under environmental 
whistleblowing statutes can depend, in part, on where, or to whom, the employee 
disclosed the information. Some cases make a distinction between internal 
90. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 480-81 
(3d Cir. 1993). See also Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1989), 886 F.2d 147, 148 
(8th Cir. 1989) (describing the four elements of a prima facie discrimination case under 
the Energy Reorganization Act); Lockert v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 867 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 
1989) (holding that an employee was not protected by the whistleblower provisions of the 
Energy Reorganization Act and National Labor Relations Act); DeFord v. Sec’y of Labor, 
700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983) (listing the three elements of a valid discrimination 
claim for participating in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeding under the Energy 
Reorganization Act).
91. Dixon v. Dep’t of Interior, ARB No. 06-147, ALJ No. 2005-SDW-8, slip op. at 8 
(Dep’t of Labor Aug. 28, 2008) (quoting Jenkins v. EPA, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-
SWD-2, slip op. at 1617 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 28, 2003)).   
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and external complaints.92 Internal complaints generally involve employee 
communications directly to an employer, supervisor, or other employee that 
may be in a position to address the issue being raised; while external complaints 
are made to persons or entities outside the employee’s employer, such as 
regulators or the press. Crucially, employees are protected for reporting both 
internal concerns and external concerns to a variety of persons, agencies and 
offi ces. The following have been recognized as appropriate forms of protected 
disclosures:
• Complaining to a state agency.93
• Cooperating with and complaining to local authorities.94
92. The controversy about whether internal employee complaints are protected arose 
in a case interpreting the employee protection provision of the Energy Reorganization 
Act (ERA). See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1029 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that purely internal quality control complaints were not protected under the ERA). 
Several other circuits disagreed with the court’s analysis in Brown & Root, and instead 
have held that internal complaints are protected. See, e.g., Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear 
Sys. Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1984) (remanding to the Secretary of Labor to 
review petitioner’s claim that he was discharged for making internal complaints); Kan. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011, 1011–
12 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s role is to resolve the 
Circuit split over whether internal complaints are protected whistleblower actions); Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that Department can interpret the Clean Water Act to protect intracorporate complaints); 
Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 928 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
an employee who questioned certain safety procedures had engaged in protected activity 
under the Energy Reorganization Act); Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee terminated for fi ling internal reports has recourse 
under the ERA); 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(a) (2011) (stating that ALJs are the fi nal arbiter of 
retaliation complaints unless a petition for review is fi led with the Administrative Review 
Board within ten days); Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
Dep’t of Labor erred in holding that petitioner’s complaints and subsequent dismissal did 
not constitute a prima facie discrimination case); Consol. Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 
61, 64 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that employer failed show cause to terminate).  
In 1992, Congress resolved the controversy by amending the ERA, specifi cally stating 
that fi ling an internal safety complaint is a protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851(a)(1)
(A)–(B) (2006) (an employer may not terminate an employee for notifying the employer 
of safety violations). The fi ling of safety complaints was relevant to whistleblowers under 
the environmental laws because the employee protection provisions of the ERA and the 
environmental laws were substantially similar prior to 1992. However, the Secretary of 
Labor has taken the position that internal complaints made pursuant to the environmental 
laws were protected. See, e.g., Poulos v. Ambassador Fuel Oil Co., Inc., 86–CAA–1, 
slip op. at 1, 3, 4 (Dep’t of Labor Apr. 27, 1987) (interpreting the Congressional intent 
of the Clean Air Act to afford broad protection to employee complaints); Bivens v. La. 
Power & Light, 89–ERA–30 slip op. at 3 (Dep’t of Labor June 4, 1991) (holding that the 
Secretary has consistently found internal complaints to be protected under the ERA and 
other environmental statutes).
93. Conley v. McClellan Air Force Base, 84-WPC-1, slip op. at 1111 (Dep’t of Labor 
Sept. 7, 1993) (fi nding that complainant engaged in protected activity when he complained 
about his employer to the California State Water Resources Control Board).
94. See Helmstetter v. Pacifi c Gas & Elec. Co, 91-TSC-1, slip op. at 3 (Dep’t of Labor 
Jan. 13, 1993) (holding that Complainant’s report of a spill to the local fi re department and 
cooperation with the district attorney’s investigation were both protected activities).
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• Participating in a television report on the leakage of radioactive 
waste.95
• Releasing reports of employees’ safety and health issues to a citizens’ 
group, a newspaper, and a federal agency.96
• Sharing information with an individual to report to responsible 
government offi cials for use in an environmental lawsuit.97
• Communicating with a reporter to prompt an investigation or with 
the media about a safety or environmental issue or problem.98
• Threatening to go to the media with safety concerns.99
• Expressing “safety-related concerns to fellow workers” publicly and 
as part of an “extended pattern of otherwise protected activity.”100
Distributing a leafl et that raised environmental concerns at a 
company picnic.101
• Writing to Congress about the environmentally deleterious impact 
of her company’s product.102
• Seeking an opinion from EPA’s Offi ce of General Counsel.103
This list summarizes types of protected activity. The underlying premise 
is that communicating with these audiences is akin to a whistleblower 
95. See Dobreuenaski v. Assoc. Univs., Inc., 96-ERA-44, slip op. at 9 (ARB Dep’t of 
Labor June 18, 1998) (providing documentation of a radioactive spill to a television station 
was a protected activity under the ERA).
96. See Gutierrez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., ARB No. 99-116, ALJ No. 1998-
ERA-19, slip op. at 2, 6 (Dep’t of Labor Nov. 13, 2002) (fi nding that an employee who 
informed these organizations of plutonium leaks engaged in protected activity).  
97. See Scott v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 92-TSC-2, slip op. at 2, 4 (Dep’t of Labor 
July 25, 1995) (holding that a complainant who turned over his employer’s documents 
to an individual, who gave the documents to state and federal offi cials, had engaged in a 
protected activity).
98. See, e.g. Wedderspoon v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 80-WPC-1 (Dep’t of 
Labor July 28, 1980); Carter v. Elec. Dist. No. 2 of Pinal Cnty., 92-TSC-11, slip op. at 12 
(Dep’t of Labor July 26, 1995) (holding that complainant’s allegations giving his employer 
negative publicity in the press were protected under the whistleblower statutes); Floyd v. 
Az. Pub. Serv. Co., 90-ERA-39, slip op. at 4 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 23, 1994) (holding that 
complainant giving documents to a reporter concerning his employer’s safety violations 
engaged in a protected activity); Pooler v. Snohomish Cnty. Airport, 87-TSC-1, slip op. at 
3 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 14, 1994) (holding that complainant engaged in a protected activity 
when he spoke to a reporter about a toxic waste dumping incident and provided him with a 
written report).
99. See Dias-Robainas v. Fla. Power & Light, 92-ERA-10, slip op. at 7 (Dep’t of 
Labor Jan. 19, 1996) (holding that the complainant’s threat to report safety concerns to the 
Miami Herald was a protected activity).
100. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1576 (11th Cir. 1997).
101. Immanuel v. Wy. Concrete Indus., Inc., 95-WPC-3, slip op. at 8 (Dep’t of Labor 
Oct. 24, 1995).
102. Jenkins v. EPA, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-2, slip op. at 17 (Dep’t of 
Labor Feb. 28, 2003).
103. Id. (holding that seeking an opinion from Agency counsel on the legality of other 
criteria may be protected activity because it questions the appropriateness of regulations).
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communicating with the government. In determining whether an employee has 
presented her concerns to an appropriate party, consider the oversight authority 
of the party (e.g., a government agency) or the connection between the party 
receiving the information and an opportunity for oversight or investigation 
(e.g., supervisor, inspector, media, or environmental group).  
PROVING DISCRIMINATION/RETALIATION
Despite the broad scope of potentially protected activities, proving that an 
employee has been discriminated against because she engaged in an activity 
protected by one of the federal environmental statutes is more cumbersome. 
It is diffi cult to navigate the legal process and satisfy the legal standards 
necessary to prove discrimination and retaliation claims.  
The employee bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she suffered retaliation in violation of the law.104 However, 
as applied, an employee’s “burden of proof in a whistleblower action is 
formidable.”105 One case has stated: “[t]o show that adverse action was taken 
‘because of’ protected activity, [the employee] must show that his protected 
activity was a ‘motivating’ factor in [the employer’s] decision to dismiss 
him.”106 In other words, the employee must show that her protected activity 
played the predominant role in triggering the adverse action taken against her. 
If the employer offers any other basis for the adverse action, which employers 
typically do, then the employee’s burden to prove her case is very heavy.107 For 
instance, one case has described the employee’s burden as follows:
The complainant has the ultimate burden of persuading 
that the legitimate reason articulated by the respondent 
was a pretext for discrimination, either by showing that the
104. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (holding that the 
plaintiff in an employer racial discrimination case must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence).
105. Miller v. Lower Makefi eld Pub. Works Dept., 2009-CAA-00010, slip op at 22 
(Dep’t of Labor Apr. 27, 2010). 
106. Lopez v. Serbaco, Inc., ARB No. 04-158, ALJ No. 04-CAA-5, slip op. at 4 (Dep’t 
of Labor Nov. 29, 2006) (citations omitted).
107. When the employer offers a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action the 
employee can try to prove that the employer’s reason for the action is a pretext. Morris v. 
LG&E Power Svcs. summarized the employee’s burden to prove pretext as follows: “It is 
not suffi cient for [the employee] to establish that the decision to terminate [his] employment 
was not ‘just, or fair, or sensible . . . rather he must show that the explanation is a phony 
reason.’ Thus, [the employee] must show that the [the employer’s] proffered explanations 
are false and a pretext for discrimination.” Morris v. LG&E Power Svcs., LLC, ALJ No. 
2004-CAA-14, ARB No. 05-047, slip op. at 44 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 28, 2007) (citation 
omitted). If pretext cannot be shown and both a legitimate and an illegitimate reason for 
an adverse action are offered, then a dual motive analysis must be performed. “[O]nce the 
employee shows that illegal motives played some part in the discharge, the employer must 
prove that it would have discharged the employee even if he had not engaged in protected 
conduct.” Pogue v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys. Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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unlawful reason more likely motivated it or by showing
that the proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. . 
. . At all times, the complainant has the burden of showing 
that the real reason for the adverse action was discriminatory.108 
In some cases, OSHA or an ALJ may initially skip the analysis of the 
complainant’s prima facie case and fi rst address whether the respondent 
employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to take the personnel 
action.  
                   REMEDIES
The remedies available under the employee protection provisions of the 
federal environmental statutes are intended to make whole an employee who 
has been discriminated against. In general, an employee who succeeds may be 
entitled to reinstatement, back pay, medical expenses, interest on lost wages, 
a clear personnel record, compensatory damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, 
and litigation costs.109 These remedies are often more theoretical than real for 
many employees because their cases have little chance of succeeding under the 
current procedural and substantive legal standards.110
TRACK RECORD OF ENVIRONMENTAL WHISTLEBLOWERS 
OVER THE LAST DECADE
Unfortunately, the employee protection provisions contained in the federal 
environmental statutes do not provide adequate protections for employees who 
disclose environmental problems. Thus, the goal of encouraging employees 
to report environmental problems and potential violations of permits and 
regulatory standards has not been realized. For example, case decisions of the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s Offi ce of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) reveal 
that from 2000 through 2010 only seventeen of 127 decided environmental 
whistleblower cases (slightly over thirteen percent) have resulted in some type 
of relief for the employee.  
Out of the 127 cases sampled, fi fty-fi ve were appealed to the ARB. Of 
those, the ARB upheld the ALJ’s recommended decision in forty, reversed 
or vacated ALJ’s ruling in fi fteen—rendering three split decisions, and 
dismissed two appeals as untimely. In cases where the ARB upheld the ALJ’s 
recommendation, only one decision affi rmed an initial win for the employee.
108. Crosier v. Westinghouse Hanford, 92-CAA-03, 1994 WL 897404, slip op. at 55 
(Dep’t of Labor Jan. 12, 1994) (citations omitted). 
109. See, e.g., Fabricius v. Town of Briantree Park Dept., ALJ No. 97-CAA-14, ARB 
No. 97-144, slip op. at 99 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 9, 1999).  
110. For an assessment of developments in the area of whistleblower protection during 
the Obama Administration, see TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE 
WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 183-186 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2011).  
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Where the ARB’s decisions reversed or vacated the ALJ’s recommendation, 
six stripped the whistleblower of a previous win.
As a result, employees who have exposed environmental problems have 
become victims rather than heroes. It is likely that their experiences and a 
general fear of retaliation have prevented more employees from coming 
forward. These case outcomes prove that reform is needed and that employees 
need to be included in efforts to ensure better environmental and public health 
protections. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING THE EMPLOYEE PROTECTION 
PROVISIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
While the rights of and protections for environmental whistleblowers have 
languished, both the Congress and state legislatures have recognized the 
importance of improving the procedural and substantive safeguards for a variety 
of employees in diverse industries, which range from public transportation to 
fi nancial accountability for publicly traded corporations. In general, however, 
the fi rst steps taken by Congress to improve protections for whistleblowers 
focused on federal employees.
In 1989, Congress amended the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) by 
enacting the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and signifi cantly changed 
the legal landscape of employee protection. The stated intent of the WPA was:
[T]o strengthen and improve protection for the rights 
of Federal employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate 
wrongdoing within the Government by—(1) mandating that 
employees should not suffer adverse consequences as a result 
of prohibited personnel practices; and (2) establishing . . . that 
while disciplining those who commit prohibited personnel 
practices may be used as a means by which to help accomplish 
that goal, the protection of individuals who are the subject
of prohibited personnel practices remains the paramount 
consideration.111  
When interpreted as Congress intended,112 the WPA is a powerful tool 
for protecting government employees and encouraging transparency.113 The 
WPA made it easier for federal government employees to prove claims of 
whistleblower retaliation. As a result of the WPA, employees are required to
111. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 2(b)(1) & (b)(2)(C), 
103103 Stat. 1616 (codifi ed as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)).  
112. Congress intended that whistleblowing would receive appropriate protection. 
The Senate report accompanying the WPA made this point clear by stating: “[r]egardless of 
the offi cial’s motives, personnel actions against employees should quite simpy [sic] not be 
based on protected activities such as whistleblowing.” S. REP. NO. 100-413 at 16 (1988).
113. Efforts have been undertaken over the last several years to further improve 
and correct the WPA through amendments in order to address court decisions that have 
weakened its protections.  
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their whistleblowing disclosure
was a “contributing factor” in the personnel action taken against them, instead 
of a “signifi cant factor” as was required under the CSRA.114  
Perhaps the most signifi cant change made by the WPA was the shifting in 
the burden of proof. The WPA increased the employer’s burden by requiring 
the employer to establish as an affi rmative defense that it would have taken 
the adverse action even if the employee had not engaged in protected activity. 
Moreover, if the employee establishes that whistleblowing was a “contributing 
factor” in the adverse action, then the burden of proof shifts such that the 
employer must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that it would 
have taken the same personnel action even in the absence of the employee’s 
whistleblowing.115 These amendments revolutionized employee protection 
law and have been incorporated into many other federal and state laws.116 
Following Congress’s lead in creating the WPA, these new laws include the 
following features: 
• Extending the statute of limitations in many provisions to at least 
180 days;117 
• Requiring the employee to prove unlawful discrimination by 
establishing by a preponderance of evidence that her protected 
activity was a “contributing factor” to the adverse action taken by 
the employer;118 
• Providing that when the employee meets her burden of proof 
the burden shifts to the employer to prove by “clear and 
convincing” evidence that it would have taken the adverse action 
even if the employee had not engaged in protected activity;119 
114. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(B)(i) (2006) (stating that the Board will require employer 
action if it determines that the whistleblower’s complaint contributed to a negative 
personnel action against him). 
115.  5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) (2006). 
116. See, e.g., Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2006) (nuclear power 
and weapons whistleblowers); Aviation Investment and Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 
(2006) (aviation industry whistleblowers); FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 301 (2011) (food industry whistleblowers); National Transit System Security Act of 
2007, 6 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006) (transit system whistleblowers); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A (2010) (fi nancial accountability whistleblowers); Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2007) (commercial driving whistleblowers); Federal 
Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2008) (railroad carrier whistleblowers); Pipeline 
Safety Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (2006) (pipeline safety whistleblowers); 
Consumer Product Safety & Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087 (2008) (consumer 
product whistleblowers); District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. CODE 
§ 1-615.54 (2008) (District of Columbia government employee whistleblowers). For a 
more complete listing of federal laws with employee protection provisions, see DEVINE & 
MAASSARANI, supra note 30, at 247–50.      
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851.
118.  Id.
119.  Id.
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• In several provisions, providing preliminary relief if the employee 
receives a successful determination at the investigatory stage;120 and 
• In many provisions, allowing the employee to remove her/his case 
to U.S. District Court to seek a jury trial if the administrative process 
is not concluded within less than one year.121
 Beyond the best practice procedural safeguards and substantive improvements 
represented in the more recent employee protection provisions, more must 
be done to connect environmental whistleblowing with environmental 
enforcement. The EPA should require that all permit holders acknowledge the 
rights of their employees to report environmental concerns to their managers or 
others who may instigate action to address the concerns. This acknowledgment 
should be built into all EPA and authorized states program permits.   
To this end, the EPA should consider following the lead of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC specifi cally provides within its
permitting and licensing structure that “[d]iscrimination by a Commission 
licensee, an applicant for a Commission license, or a contractor or subcontractor 
of a Commission licensee or applicant against an employee for engaging in 
certain protected activities is prohibited.”122 NRC regulations further provide 
that a violation of this prohibition may result in “(1) Denial, revocation, or 
suspension of the license. (2) Imposition of a civil penalty on the licensee, 
applicant, or a contractor or subcontractor of the licensee or applicant. (3) Other 
enforcement action.”123 The EPA’s implementation of the NRC’s approach 
would enhance protection and more directly tie environmental whistleblowing 
to enforcement.
Moreover, Congress could readily increase reporting and reward 
environmental whistleblower if it created a bounty program like the one 
implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.124 In 2010, EPA reported that it secured over $150 million 
in civil penalties and criminal fi nes and restitution.125 Imagine how much 
more in penalties and fi nes would be recovered and how much environmental
120.  Id.
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010).
122. 10 C.F.R. § 50.7(a) (2011). 
123. 10 C.F.R. § 50.7(c) (2011).  
124. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Pub. L. 111-
203 § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (codifi ed as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).. 
The Act “added new Section 21F to the Exchange Act, entitled ‘Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection.’ Section 21F directs that the Commission pay awards, subject 
to certain limitations and conditions, to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the 
Commission with original information about a violation of the securities laws that leads to 
the successful enforcement of an action brought by the Commission that results in monetary 
sanctions exceeding $ 1,000,000.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 
Fed. Reg. 34,300 (Summary and Background) (June 13, 2011) (codifi ed at 17 C.F.R. §§ 
240.21F-1 to 240.21F-17).
125. See Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results 2010 Fiscal Year, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa. gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2010/index.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2010).  
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degradation might be detected or prevented if employees were rewarded for 
blowing the whistle.
Far from being rewarded, employees who disclose environmental violations 
are lacking important substantive and procedural protections provided in the 
newer laws. Exclusion of environmental whistleblowers from these newer 
protections poorly serves both the public and the courageous employees who 
reveal critical information that may help protect the air we breathe, the water 
we drink, and the food we eat.  
CONCLUSION
Congress should immediately provide a twenty-fi rst century upgrade for 
environmental whistleblowers, including incentivizing disclosures through a 
bounty program. Failing to do so places serious limits on the ability of the EPA 
and authorized state agencies to take advantage of the observations and insights 
of those working in jobs that may impact the environment. The employee 
protection provisions in the federal environmental statutes, which became 
law in the 1970s and 1980s, have a poor history of protecting employees. 
These provisions deter rather than encourage employees to help protect the 
environment and expose wrongdoing and, likewise, must be improved.
